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EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGES: DETERRING ABUSE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT"STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION"
David J. Abell
HE Beverly Hills League of Women Voters, exercising their First
Amendment rights, wrote letters to the Los Angeles Times and Beverly Hills Courier expressing opposition to a condominium development proposed by Maple Properties. Maple Properties, fearing opposition
would hinder their development, sued the League members for $63 million.
The developer claimed damages based on libel, slander, interference with
prospective economic advantage, violation of equal protection, and conspiracy. The lawsuit progressed all the way to the United States Supreme Court
where an appeals court decision in favor of the League was affirmed. After
the claim was dismissed, the League was awarded the statutory maximum of
$20,000 for attorney fees and court costs.1
A recent surge in lawsuits that attack a citizen's right to speak freely in
public or to petition the government has been a serious concern for the adversely affected citizen and legislator alike. Average citizens are being sued
for socially encouraged political participation. 2 Researchers estimate that
hundreds of lawsuits are filed each year in order to silence weaker political
3
opponents.
Suits brought primarily in retaliation for any activity in opposition to the
1. Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25,
1991, at 6.
2. For examples of SLAPP suits reported by Pring, infra note 3, see Protect Our Mountain Env't Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (en banc); Webb v. Fury, 282
S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 645 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1982) (en banc),
vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), aff'd on indep. state const grounds, 661 P.2d
1072 (Cal. 1983); Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Myers v. Plan
Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983); Streif v. Bovinette, 411 N.E.2d 341 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Miner v. Novotny, 481 A.2d 508 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984), aff'd, 498 A.2d 269 (Md.
1985); Weissman v. Mogol, 462 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Okun v. Superior Court,
629 P.2d 1369 (Cal.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981), on remand sub nom., Maple Properties v. Harris, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S 1054 (1985);
Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Butte
County v. Bach, 218 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
3. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1989); see generally Penelope Canan, The SLAPPs from a Sociological
Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1989) (describing the research).
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plaintiff's business interest have been labelled "SLAPP" suits (Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation). 4 Another species of retaliatory litigation, also falling within the definition of SLAPP, is the countersuit when
used as a vehicle for intimidation. 5 Although these suits rarely win the specific damages sought, they succeed in accomplishing their true goals of retaliation, intimidation, and the elimination of weaker opponents. 6 Since it was
first identified and defined in 1988 by Penelope Canan and George Pring, the
7
SLAPP suit has engendered much discussion and debate.
The message sent by SLAPP suits is that if you participate in legitimate
(and Constitutionally protected) public discussion, you should be prepared
to litigate. 8 Just as corporations consider litigation a cost of doing business,
4. The SLAPP suit acronym was first coined by George Pring and Penelope Canan who
led the first intensive research project to study this type of action. The published research of
Canan and Pring represents a quantitative and qualitative analysis of over 100 identified
SLAPP suits. See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, StrategicLawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. PRODS. 506, (1988); see also Canan, supra note 3, at 23; Pring, supra note 3,
at 3.
5. Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits" A New Approach, 28
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 113 (1988).

6. The weaker opponents may be economically unable or politically unwilling to participate in litigation especially when the claim is ancillary to the original dispute.
7. Bill Ainsworth, Wilson Signs Bill CurbingSLAPP suits, RECORDER, Sept. 18, 1992, at
4; Cerisse Anderson, Developer's Tax Lawsuit Dismissed as Frivolous, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 1991,
at I; Cerisse Anderson, Judge'sRuling EnlargesScope of.Statute on Recovering Costs; Allows
Maximum of$1OO, 000for Each PrevailingParty, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1992, at I; Cerisse Anderson, CourtAssesses $10,000 Costs in SLAPPSuit, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1992, at 1; Andrew Blum,
SLAPP Suits Continue in High Gear: A Pairof Firsts,NAT. L.J., May 18, 1992, at 3; Robert H.
Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed; SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6; Curbing SLAPP Suits, NEWSLETrER, Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, Mar. 17, 1992, at 4 (Supplement
to the RECORDER); Mark Cursi, Developer's SLAPP Suit Called "Repugnant", RECORDER,
Feb. 27, 1991, at 3; Jim Doyle, Sewer Agency Must Pay Richmond Man $205,100 Damagesfor
Suit Against Environmentalist, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1992, at D8; Bruce Fein, Code Greenfor
Impunity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at GI; Ronald J. Fleury, Gadflies Gain New Ground in
Fending OffLibel Suits, N.J.L.J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 1; Lisa Gibbs, Getting SLAPPed Around;
These Suits are Aimed at Quieting Critics, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at 10; Paula Goedert,
The SLAPP Suit Threat: Squelching PublicDebate;Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 22 AM. LIaR. Ass'N. 1003 (1991); Philip Hager, Tide Turnsfor Targets of SLAPP Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at 3; Walter Lucas, Using the Courts to Quiet Critics"Activists
Get SLAPPed Around in New Breed of Cases, N.J.L.J., Dec. 27, 1990, at 3; Scott E. Mollen,
SLAPP Suits-Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Under 22 NYCRR Part 130-1 for Frivolous Conduct, Based on Prosecution of Colorable Claimfor Improper Purpose, Not Unconstitutional, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1992, [Realty Law Digest] at 4; Karl Olson & Erin Daly, A Slap at
SLAPP Suits is a Signature Away, RECORDER, Oct. 7, 1991, at 6; Robert D. Richards, Suing to
Squelch; A New Way to Keep Activists Quiet, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992, at CI; David Sive,
Countersuits Delay, Intimidation Caused by Public InterestSuits, NAT. L.J., June 19, 1989, at
26; SLAPP in the Face of Texas Activists, GREENWIRE, May 6, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current File; Gary Spencer, Bill Aimed at Curbing RetaliatorySuits, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 3, 1990, at 1; Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs Bill to Deter SLAPP Lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6,
1992, at 1; Ralph M. Stein, SLAPP Suits: The Threat Can be Enough, NAT. L.J., July 20, 1992,
[Letters] at 14 (author is a professor at Pace University School of Law); Daniel Wise, Community Groups Protected by Ruling; SLAPP Suit by Club Developer Dismissed, N.Y.L.J., June 25,
1991, at 1; Todd Woody, Jury FindsSLAPP Suit Violated Activist's Rights, RECORDER, Oct. 7,
1992, at 2; Todd Woody, SLAPP and SLAPP Back, RECORDER, Sept. 29, 1992, at 1.
8. See generally Pring, supra note 3, at 21; Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 385 (1988). An additional study was conducted of 228 suits
fitting the SLAPP definition to help refine their conclusions.
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active community members are now being forced to assess the value of their
public participation against the potential risk of being hauled into the courtroom by those whose business interests might be adversely affected. Unfortunately, a price is being fixed on the exercise of Constitutional rights as
citizens are forced to defend against frivolous, retaliatory lawsuits. When
approving New York legislation aimed at SLAPP suits, Governor Mario
Cuomo stated, "[t]he aim of SLAPP suits is simple and brutal. The individual is to regret ever having entered the public arena to tell government what
she thinks about something directly affecting her."9
The use of litigation as a tool of intimidation and retaliation is an extraordinarily complex one. Constitutional guarantees of protected free speech
and the right to petition the government compete against the presumptively
legitimate interests of the plaintiff who seeks redress through the legal system. Despite the highlighted abuses of the legal system, anecdotal evidence
should not be utilized to spur significant changes in the practice of law. The
law has a long history of intimidation. It is inherent in the nature of the
adversarial context within which litigants operate. Reinforcing the impact
of intimidation is the reality that opposing parties will suffer or benefit from
inequality of disposable resources.10 The best interest of the litigant will always be served by use of all tools at the litigant's disposal whenever the
expected benefit outweighs the potential cost.
Consideration of the plaintiff's justifications for filing such claims is critical. Many times litigation may be the only source of redress the plaintiff is
able to exploit. The plaintiff may have had legitimate business goals emasculated by delays created by zealous opposition groups. Often, the major complaint of the SLAPP plaintiff (i.e. a land developer) is that the defendant (i.e.
a neighboring land owner) is the party who is prostituting the Constitution
through the unethical invocation of free speech and the petition clause.
Quintessential difficulties that permeate the increasing use of intimidation
suits involve notions of due process, fairness, free speech, ability to petition
government, and representation. SLAPP suits typically involve a party who
suffers from an enormous inequality of resources. The advantaged party is
able to use the legal process as a tool of intimidation and retaliation. Intimidation is no longer an element of the process, but becomes the recognized
purpose and goal. This goal exploits the legal process in an effort to punish
citizens for their involvement in constitutionally protected activities. There9. Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs Bill to Deter SLAPP Lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at
1. The legislation enacted by Governor Cuomo's signature was Chapter 767 of the Laws of
1992. 1992 N.Y. Laws 767.
10. See David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL.

L. REv. 847, 854 (1986). Summary judgment is difficult to obtain in libel actions. Costs have
risen substantially, including direct expenses (attorney's fees) as well as indirect expenses (personal time). When the plaintiff claims enormous damages, defendants are forced to defend
themselves more vigorously because of the risk of defeat, even if the risk of losing is remote.
Id. at 856; see also Judith Resnik, FailingFait&- Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Ci.

L. REv. 494, 520-24 (1986) (noting that inequality in resources results in asymmetric
adjudications).
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fore, the principal question to be addressed is how to appropriately and effectively control this aberrant type of intimidation in the legal system.
This Comment takes the position that SLAPP suits do not represent a
radical departure from normal practices used in the course of litigation and
business. The danger lies not in the use of litigation for intimidation, but in
the target of the intimidation and the protected activity that has engendered
the dispute. Proposed solutions to the SLAPP problem must weigh the interests of the petitioning citizen as well as those parties legitimately filing a
cause of action that can be characterized as SLAPP or intimidation. A failure to adequately address the problem of SLAPP suits undermines the citizen's reliance on political participation to resolve local disputes and to
instigate and supplement the enactment and enforcement of governmental
regulations.
This Comment addresses proposed and current responses to the problem
of SLAPP and intimidation suits. Part I begins with an examination of the
philosophical justifications underlying the citizen suit provision. Part I also
examines the statutory and judicial encouragement of public participation,
focusing on regulatory enforcement and public interest litigation. Part II
provides background information on SLAPP suits. Part III investigates the
interests of both parties and analyzes responses to the problem that best
serve the competing interests. Part IV proposes solutions that afford the best
protection against SLAPP suits while also providing equal consideration to
the interests of those who file legitimate claims alleging standard SLAPP
causes of action.
I.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: THE FOURTH BRANCH

Before analyzing the repercussions of intimidating and retaliatory lawsuits, consideration of the essential role that the citizen plays in society is
necessary. The importance of citizen activity in a democratic form of government is self evident. Public participation is a fundamental part of a representational form of government.II In its landmark decision in Eastern
RailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.12 the Supreme
Court held that the right to petition government, and thereby effect the creation and enforcement of laws, is the centerpiece of a representational form of
government, stating that "these branches of the government act on behalf of
the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation
depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives."' 3 The Court also noted that courts should be ever cogni11. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957) ("Our form of government is
built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and
association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights .... History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups ....
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
12. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
13. Id. at 137.
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zant of the valuable information that flows from
citizens and groups who
I4
actively seek to influence governmental action.
Despite the importance of public involvement and interaction with governmental bodies, 15 public participation in American government is at drastically low levels. 16 SLAPP suits directly threaten the few citizens who are
active participants in local politics. Anecdotal evidence supports the intuitive conclusion that the threat of costly litigation prompts citizens to end
their civic participation. 17 This chilling effect has long been a concern for
courts considering the boundaries of defamation law.' 8
Even more surprising is that SLAPP suits are not only reserved for
wealthy developers and industries, but have also been used by government
agencies to silence public critics. 19 For example, Alan LaPointe filed a taxpayer's suit against the San Francisco public sewer agency for allegedly unlawful spending of $1 million for an incinerator. The sewer district filed a
counterclaim accusing LaPointe and 490 other unnamed co-defendants of
subversion of economic interests, instigating grand jury proceedings, and
challenging the district's air pollution permits. The sewer district claimed
$42 million in damages. 20 "A healthy democracy thrives on passionate dis14. Id at 137-38.
15. Studies of citizen activism and their effect on growth policy shows that citizen groups
are typically instrumental in drafting initiative proposals that eventually generate restrictive
municipal growth policies. Todd Donovan & Max Neiman, Citizen Mobilization and the
Adoption of Suburban Growth Controls, WESTERN POL. Q., Sept. 1992, at 651, 672.
16. Only 10% of the adult population actively participates in politics in the United States.
See LESTER W. MILBRAITH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS (1965); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
IN AMERICA (1976).
17. Three farmers placed an ad in their local newspaper supporting a controversial water
project and were subsequently sued by a powerful grower for libel. Nine years after the original suit was filed, the farmers find themselves still mired in the legal system. Although the
three have won a $13.5 million jury verdict for malicious prosecution, their attorney claims
that "[t]o this day, that suit has chilled them from getting involved in any political activity ever
again." Philip Hager, Tide Turnsfor Targets of SLAPP Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at
A3.
18. 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 610 N.E.2d 930, 933 (N.Y. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2341 (1993). The court considered New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and companion defamation cases and recognized that
when the rules of defamation are drawn too finely, when any erroneous statement is likely to open the statement-maker to liability, First Amendment values
suffer because would-be communicators, fearing lawsuits, may be reluctant to
risk expressing themselves. To avoid that result, and the resulting impoverishment of the public forum, the [Supreme] Court has been willing to allow in some
circumstances otherwise valid claims of reputational harm to go uncompensated
in order to encourage citizens and media outlets to express themselves freely
when matters of public interest are at issue.
600 West 115th St. Corp., 610 N.E.2d at 933-34.
A balance must be formed between the state's interest in protecting against defamatory
harm and the Constitutional guarantee that the state not unduly burden the citizen who seeks
to participate in governmental processes. The New York court recognized that inequities are
suffered by politically active citizens who are charged with defamation as a result of their
participation. Id
19. Jim Doyle, Sewer Agency Must Pay Richmond Man $205,100 Damages for Suit
Against Environmentalists, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1992, at D8 (discussing the LaPointe
litigation).
20. Id.
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course," Lapointe said. 2 1 "When your own government files a SLAPP
against you for speaking out, that is the ultimate outrage." 22 The charges
against LaPoint demonstrate how the threat of retributive litigation levies a
23
price on all types of civic activity.
The United States Constitution established the ability to participate politically for every citizen, inherent in the freedom of speech and the right to
petition the government. 24 In 1972 the Supreme Court's holding in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited 25 extended to citizens the
philosophy that petitioning activities are fundamental to our representational form of government. 26 The right "to petition for redress of grievances
[is] among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights." 27 The ability to speak freely and petition the government is considered a "fundamental personal right." 28 Petitioning has long been considered
29
by the highest court as a right implicit in the "very idea of government."
The concept of citizens' public participation in governmental functioning is
at the core of the republican form of government and has historically been
afforded great respect. 30 Courts have consistently extended a deferential
hand to citizens exercising their right to petition by providing constitutional
immunity from personal liability. 3'
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Some of the activities reported by researcher George Pring, for which citizens have
been sued, include reporting violations of law, attending public hearings, lobbying for legislation, participating in a peaceful boycott or demonstration, circulating petitions, sending letters to government officials, calling a consumer protection agency, reporting police
misconduct, campaigning in initiative or referendum elections, serving as an officer of the
League of Women Voters during a good government campaign, speaking up at a school board
meeting about a poor teacher or unsafe facilities, testifying at a governmental hearing, supporting a public-interest, and law-reform lawsuit. Pring, supra note 3, at 4-5.
24. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

25. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The philosophy of Noerr "governs the approach of citizens or
groups of them to administrative agencies... and to courts.... Certainly, the right to petition
extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but
one aspect of the right of petition." Id. at 510. This analysis was recognized by the New York
District Court in Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Assoc., 467 F. Supp. 803, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citing additional authority Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1978) (petitioning activity included filing a complaint with
the Internal Revenue Service)); International Union UAW v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense & Educ. Found., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.D.C. 1977) (right of party to litigate);
Center for United Labor Action v. Consolidated Edison Co., 376 F. Supp. 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (right to petition state administrative agencies).
26. California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510.
27. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
28. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
29. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
30. Id.; McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (tracing the historical roots of the
Petition Clause since 1689). See generally, Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging. . ." An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 CINN. L. REV.
1153 (1986); Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569
(1987).
31. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
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Citizen involvement is crucial at the local level, especially in the environmental review process. 32 Citizens are usually on the front line in an environmental battle. They have the most at stake and are generally the first to
recognize potential environmental problems and the possible impact on their
neighborhoods and families. 33 New York Attorney General Robert Abrams
highlighted the vital role played by New York citizen activists in aiding the
government in enforcement of environmental laws. 34 For example, the civic
activity of Louis Gibbs and the Love Canal Homeowners Association
brought the enormity of the toxic waste pollution problem into the public
35
consciousness.
State constitutions, civil rights statutes, privilege and immunity statutes,
and judicial decisions recognize and protect the right and ability of citizens
to participate in governmental decision making. 36 State and local laws relat37
ing to land use generally provide for significant participation by the public.
Much of the federal environmental legislation expressly provides for extensive public participation and considers citizen involvement to be a supple38
mental enforcement tool.
138 (1961); California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510 (extending the Noerr immunity
beyond antitrust to citizen petitioning activities); see also Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslav-

sky, 626 F.2d 607, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1980) (discussing the extension of constitutional immunity
to those exercising their right to petition).
32. Out of 350 lawsuits filed under New York State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), one-third were brought by citizens. Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation,7 PACE ENVT'L. L. REv. 33, 34-35 (1989) (address by Attorney General
Robert Abrams, Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Pace University School of Law,
White Plains, New York, Oct. 14, 1989). SEQRA is a New York law that requires an environmental impact study to be completed for any project that threatens to have a significant impact
on the environment. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-109(2) (McKinney 1984). The Act
requires the impact statement to be available to the public and for public hearings to be held to
provide a forum for the expression of public comment. Id. § 8-109(4). Attorney General
Abrams noted that projects are frequently changed to address public concern and some are
canceled. Abrams, supra, at 36. "A number of these citizen suits have established essential
procedures of early review and strict adherence to the procedures laid out in SEQRA. These
principles have served as crucial tools in making projects safer for the environment." Id.
33. Abrams, supra note 32, at 36.
34. Id. at 35. Abrams cites many other situations in which New York citizens were instrumental in his department's enforcement of environmental legislation. The Hudson River
Fisherman's Association "blew the whistle" on Exxon for dumping contaminated water from
their cargo ships into the Hudson River. Id Citizen groups were responsible for saving Storm
King Mountain from destructive plans to build a power plant. Id. (citing de Rham v. Diamond, 295 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1973)). A New York City highway project was canceled due to
the efforts of a group called the Clean Air Campaign. Id. at 36 (citing Sierra Club v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1985)). The Tuxedo Landfill in Orange
County was placed on the state's list of hazardous waste sites after residents near the dump
complained to the attorney general and testified in court. Id. (citing State v. Barone, 546
N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1980)). Allied-Signal was forced to pay for the clean up of eighty tons of
mercury and a three-to-four-foot layer of calcite from the bottom of a Syracuse lake. Court
action was prompted by the efforts of several citizen groups acting in concert. Id. (citing State
v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 815 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 27, 1989)).
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 49-89 and accompanying text; S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1970) (commenting on the adoption of alternate forms of enforcement as a result of the
poor enforcement history of federal agencies); 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
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CIRCUMVENTING TRADITIONAL BARRIERS TO LITIGATION

There are several barriers to citizen involvement in public interest litigation. The public interest litigant is generally facing an opponent who enjoys
tremendous financial reserves and is able to hire the best lobbyists, publicists,
and attorneys. 39 Corporate and public entities have the luxury of time and
are able to engage in protracted litigation. This economic imbalance provides a significant advantage for the typical target of public interest action
and SLAPP plaintiffs. The average citizen or neighborhood group is unable
to afford the cost of impact studies and expert witnesses, while their characteristic opponent enjoys the luxury of a large war chest.40 The citizen may
be forced to continue the expensive battle outside of the courtroom as public
interest defendants often utilize public relations consultants to generate sup41
port from the media and the public.
The litigation process itself is a significant barrier to the citizen who exercises the right to petition. Generally, as in environmental claims, the plaintiff is required to exhaust all administrative remedies. When they do make it
42
to court for review, the review is confined to the administrative record.
The process can become quite complex and overwhelming to the average
citizen. Litigants must satisfy traditional requirements of standing to sue.
To obtain an injunction, the party must make a showing of irreparable injury. Intervention may also be difficult to obtain. In an effort to facilitate
such litigation, the courts and legislatures have devised mechanisms that reduce the barriers faced by the public interest litigant.
1.

JudicialCircumvention

The courts have recognized the importance of citizen participation in governmental decision making. This realization is especially evident in the enforcement and execution of federal regulations. 43 In response, the courts
have substantially relaxed the barriers typically faced by litigants, namely
the traditional requirements of standing and intervention. 44 The courts recognize citizen groups as an important regulatory tool and have conferred
upon them a special status. For example, one court observed:
[C]itizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but
rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental inMuskie) (noting that the Clean Air Act (CAA) regulatory scheme presents an enormous enforcement burden on the EPA and requires the support and assistance of private citizens in the

monitoring of the regulated community).
39. Brecher, supra note 5, at 109.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
43. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816

(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376) (1990)); Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626
(1990)).

44. Earnest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J.
359, 359-68 (1972).
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terests... [t]he citizen suits provision reflected a deliberate choice by
Congress to widen citizen access to the courts. . . . [To reflect that
choice] jurisdictional barriers to citizen actions, such as amount in controversy
and standing requirements are expressly discarded by the
45
Act.
To satisfy the standing requirement in citizen enforcement actions, the citizen must show an injury in fact to interests "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated" by the legislation. 46 The harm is not
required to be significant. For example, citizens may sue for almost any
violation under the Clean Water Act.4 7 The courts have responded by providing mechanisms that allow citizens who lack sufficient grounds to intervene (i.e. citizens who are not personally or economically affected by the
48
outcome) to express their views in a public forum.
2. Legislative Circumvention
Public participation through citizen suits is designed to supplement and
expedite official administrative action and is recognized as an effective enforcement tool. 49 Before the rise of modem environmental regulation, a citizen's only effective redress for environmental injury was an action based on
common law tort claims, such as public nuisance, trespass, and negligence.50
The growing awareness that these common law actions, in addition to the
current environmental regulations, were not providing acceptable levels of
compliance 5 led to the proposal and 1970 enactment of a citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act (CWA). 5 2 The addition of the citizen suit enforcement provision and the expansion of the Agency's authority was
primarily due to the ineffectiveness of the enforcement provisions contained
45. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1977) (citations omitted).
46. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (holding that standing may be established based on injury to noneconomic interests). A public interest group may sue for
noneconomic injury provided one of its members has been harmed. Id. at 734-35.
47. Id.; Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1419, 1424 (D.N.J. 1985). The court ruled, citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669 (1973), that standing is not limited by the size of the injury. Plaintiffs do not have to
demonstrate that they were "significantly" harmed. Id. All that is required is an "identifiable
trifle" that constitutes actual or threatened (economic or noneconomic) injury. Id
48. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 (holding that a public interest group may sue for
noneconomic injury provided one of its members has been harmed); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (accepting the idea of a private attorney general). But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992) (refusing to provide
standing to a group claiming injury due to a lack of consultation regarding activities abroad
that result in increased rates of extinction of endangered and threatened species). "Vindicating
the public interest is the function of the Congress and the Chief Executive". Id. at 2134.
49. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745-46
(1972).
50. Sharon Elliot, Citizen Suits under the Clean Water Act: Waitingfor Godot in the Fifth
Circuit, 62 TULANE L. REV. 175, 176 (1987).
51. See generally United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); Jeffrey G. Miller, PrivateEnforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part V, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,309 (1983).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (providing the authority to any citizen to initiate a civil action for violation of the Clean Water Act provisions).
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in the first generation environmental protection statutes. 53 The citizen suit

provision was intended to extend to private citizens a broad authority to act
as private attorneys general who may bring suit in federal district courts
alleging violations of the Environmental Protection Agency's adopted pollution control requirements.

54

When Congress considered creating avenues for public participation in
environmental regulations, it envisioned public regulatory activism as serving two functions. First, public action would serve as an alternate means of
regulatory enforcement. 55 The private citizen would be able to initiate appropriate enforcement action when the EPA was reluctant or unable to insti-

tute official enforcement action. 56 Second, the involvement of the private
sector as an additional party with the power to compel compliance would
57
stimulate EPA's efforts to enforce its regulations.

Congress also constructed the citizen suit provision to protect the regulated community from abuse and harassment, while effectuating more comprehensive enforcement of environmental regulations. Three mechanisms
were incorporated to check potential abuse of the citizen suit: 58 a sixty day

notice requirement, 59 a diligent governmental prosecution defense, 60 and a
6
limitation on the availability of attorneys fees. '
The Citizen suit provisions were especially important in the manner in

53. Enforcement of these statutes had proved to be complex and time-consuming. See
H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5360 (calling for new legislation to replace the time-consuming and complex procedures outlined in the
Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967)). See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 200-21 (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1988)).
54. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 12(a), § 304(a), 84 Stat.
1676, 1706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991)); 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1988).
55. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970) (commenting on the adoption of
alternate forms of enforcement as a result of the poor enforcement history of federal agencies);
116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (noting CAA regulatory scheme
presents enormous enforcement burden on the EPA and requires support and assistance of
private citizens in the monitoring of the regulated community).
56. Id.
57. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970) (noting that citizen suits motivate governmental agencies); 116 CONG. REC. 33,104 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hart) (noting
that citizen suits are effective and desirable to motivate official action).
58. Many members of Congress expressed concern that a citizen suit provision would
generate an enormous number of lawsuits, interfere with EPA enforcement, and lead to unfairness, inequality, and inconsistency in enforcement. See 116 CONG. REC. 32,925 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska); Air Pollution-1970,Part V. Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Comm. on Public Works, United States Senate on S. 3229, S. 3466, S.
3546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1588-90 (1970) (statements of Collier, Shannon, Rill, and Edwards)
(commenting on the possibility of the generation of multiple suits) [hereinafter Hearings].
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (1988).
60. "No action may be commenced... if the Administrator or State has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order..." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (1988).
61. Congress reacted to concern that the availability of attorneys fees might result in frivolous lawsuits by leaving the award to the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (stating, in part, "[t]he court ... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate").
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which the barriers traditionally faced by citizens desiring to compel compliance were eradicated. The standing requirement and the high costs of litigation deter citizens from bringing suit under environmental regulations. In
the absence of a private right of action, citizens are required to show that
they have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, and
must demonstrate a traceable causal connection between their injury and the
defendant's conduct to satisfy the standing requirement. 62 In the environmental context, these requirements present nearly insurmountable obstacles
as a particular individualized harm is extremely difficult to link to the defendant's diffuse environmental contamination. Congress responded by enacting provisions circumventing judicial standing limitations that
63
accommodated citizens desiring to enforce environmental provisions. Citizens were given the right to bring suit to enforce environmental regulations"
as long as their interest was not generated solely from a generalized public
65
desire to reduce pollution or protect the environment.
In addition to standing impediments, Congress realized that, if reliance
was to be placed on citizens to file actions as private attorneys general, then
there must be some mechanism to avoid the high cost of litigation. 66 Under
the American Rule,67 courts are not empowered to award attorney's fees
62. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). "There must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly...
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not.., th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court' ". Id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Plaintiffs are also required to show injury in fact
to a legally protected interest that is 1) concrete and particularized and 2) actual or imminent,
not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-33
(1972) (noting on pages 739-41 that the case and controversy requirement of article III requires that individuals suffer harm particular to the plaintiff and claim injury in fact to attain
standing to sue); U.S. CONST. art III. § 2, cl. 1.
42 U.S.C.
63. "[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf.
§ 7604(a) (1988). "[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf...." 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (citizen is defined in § 1365(g) as "... a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected").
64. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1981) (affirming the relaxed standing requirements in the Clean Water Act). The
Court's interpretation of the CWA citizen suit provision conferred the right to sue as a private
attorney general for noneconomic and noncompensable injury. Id. at 13.
65. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (stating that an assertion that
alleged illegal activity will affect the plaintiff or its members satisfies article III requirements).
But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (refusing to extend standing to
those claiming injury from extinction of species in foreign countries).
66. The Environmental Law Institute conducted a study in the mid-1980s that focused on
citizen suits and found that citizens who decide to prosecute face significant litigation costs
ranging from $4,000 to $200,000 and averaging $40,000. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,
CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED
STATUTES V-25 to V-27 (1984).
67. The American rule states that "attorney's fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them ... is based upon the courts desire to
avoid placing barriers in the way of those desiring judicial redress of wrongs." Gordon v.
Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (N.Y. 1992) (citing A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak,
69 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 1986)). The Gordon court noted that the American rule has no constitutional basis but is reflective of a policy established in common and statutory law. It does not
offer a Constitutional preclusion based on the right to petition. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline
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absent independent statutory authority. 68 The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized an inherent authority of a Federal Court to assess attorney's fees
if a party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." 69 The typical private plaintiff would be able to devote relatively
limited resources to initiate and maintain litigation against a well-funded
industrial opponent. 70 Therefore, Congress created an incentive to participate by shifting the costs of reasonable attorney and expert witness fees away
from the private plaintiff.7 ' Without such a provision, citizens would be
forced to incur enormous costs of litigation and thus, be unlikely to supplement governmental enforcement of environmental regulation.

2

Limitations on Citizen Enforcement

The citizen suit provision did not enjoy unanimous support among legislators. 72 Critics feared that a dramatic increase in litigation would result in
multiple suits and court congestion. 73 Congress also feared that the citizen
suit provision would provide an avenue for frivolous and harassing lawsuits. 74 In an effort to prevent abuse of a private right to intervene or sue,
Congress enacted several restrictions that permit citizen participation only
under certain conditions. First, the citizen must provide federal and state
regulatory agencies the opportunity to commence official enforcement action
75
by filing a notice of their intent to initiate a private enforcement action.
Second, a citizen may not sue a violator if the federal or state agency has
already commenced an enforcement action, and is diligently prosecuting in
federal or state court. 76 Finally, the citizen who is found to have initiated
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975)); see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (per curiam); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717-718 (1967) (reaffirming the American Rule). "There are ample grounds for
recognizing ... that in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts have inherent power to
assess attorney's fees." Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980).
68. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). Courts are
bound to follow the American Rule unless the legislature has specifically made the exception.
Id. at 270-71.
69. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (asserting that the courts have a "well
acknowledged" inherent power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices);
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2133 (1991).
70.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR §§ 3.8-3.13

(asserting that a lack of funds is the most significant restraint on citizen suits).
71. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)
(1988). Litigation costs are awarded to either party whenever appropriate. Id.
72. See 116 CONG. REC. 33,925 (1970) (criticizing on the basis that the provision would
interfere with the traditionally independent enforcement functions of the executive branch); id.
at 33,102 (statement of Sen. Griffin) (criticizing the lack of input from the Judicial Conference,
the Department of Justice, and the Office of Management and Budget regarding the impact of
citizen suits on the judicial system).
73. See id. at 33,102 (statement of Sen. Griffin); 116 CONG. REC. 33,925 (1970) (statement
of Sen. Hruska); id. at 33,926 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (commenting on possible congestion
of the courts resulting from allowing citizens access to the courts via citizen suit provision).
74. Id. at 33,925-26 (statements of Sen. Hruska); Hearings, supra note 58, at 1583-90
(discussing the possible effect of citizen suits on the number of groundless claims filed against
regulated industries).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1988).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
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suit based on a motivation to harass will be assessed the litigation costs of
77
both parties.
Citizens who find a violation of a permit under the CWA or CAA are
required to give federal and state environmental agencies, and the prospec-

tive defendants, a notice of alleged violations sixty days prior to the commencement of the enforcement action. 78 The notice serves several purposes.
Upon notice of a violation, the federal or state agency should be motivated
to initiate its own enforcement action. 79 The sixty day notice period allows
the government the absolute right to initiate an enforcement action before
the citizen. 80 The sixty day notice period also allows the violator to adjust
processes to come into compliance, possibly avoiding liability under the
Supreme Court's "in violation" interpretation (the citizen is prevented from

basing a suit on "wholly past violations"). 8 1 The notice period also gives the
parties additional time to avoid litigation through discussion of the circumstances that gave rise to the violation, and to negotiate settlement
82
proposals.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). Under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A), citizen enforcement of the CAA accounted for very little of the enforcement activity, primarily

due to barriers inherent in the Clean Air Act itself. Stephen Fotis, Comment, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 155 (1985). The
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act have eliminated many of those barriers. Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671). Congress attempted to resolve the problem through the addition
of provisions requiring permitees to file a routine pollutant discharge self-report and extension
of the threat of civil penalties for violations in enforcement suits filed by private citizens. Congress also eliminated a significant judicially created barrier that did not allow citizens to sue for
"wholly past" violations (i.e. a requirement that the violation be ongoing). Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987); Atlantic States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (1 1th Cir. 1990). Congress accomplished this by allowing citizens to enforce emission limitations "if there is evidence that the
alleged violation has been repeated." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101549, sec. 707(g), § 304(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2683 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)); see also David
T. Buente, A Review of Major Provisions: Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990: Closing the Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVTL. L. 2233, 2239 (1991).
79. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (stating that citizen suits should help
motivate governmental agencies to bring enforcement action); 116 CONG. REC. 33,104 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Hart) (asserting that citizen action "prods officials to do their work"); 116
CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (remarking that citizens would trigger
government enforcement by monitoring emission reports and notifying the proper enforcement
agency).
80. Fotis, supra note 78, at 149 (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971),
reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-

MENTS OF 1972 at 1498) (noting that the sixty day waiting period allows a regulatory agency
to file its own action against the violator). But see Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of
FederalPollution Control Laws Part II, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,064-65 (1984)
(citing evidence that indicates the sixty day period is insufficient for EPA to initiate an official
enforcement action).
81. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987).
Current compliance with the permit limitations would absolve the violator from liability as the
Court's decision required a showing of "ongoing" violations. See Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc.
v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 695 (4th Cir. 1989) (imposing a considerable
barrier to the initiation of CWA citizen suits through a good faith belief requirement that the
violations be ongoing).
82. Fotis, supra note 78, at 149; Miller, supra note 80, at 10,067 (claiming that the notice
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There are two additional conditions that preclude the filing of a citizen
suit action under typical regulations. The first is the diligent prosecution
defense. 8 3 This provision has been construed to mean that the enforcement
activity must be in a court setting; a federal or state administrative proceeding will not be sufficient to prohibit a citizen suit.8 4 The second limitation on
citizen suit activity is the threat of assessing against the citizen the litigation
costs of both sides if the court deems the action frivolous.8 5 The intention of
this provision was to allow defendants to recover costs when subjected 8to6
harassing and meritless litigation, and to discourage the filing of such suits.
In order for the defendant to recover the costs, the plaintiff's claim must be
87
found frivolous.
In summary, Congress' concern that the inclusion of a citizen suit provision would engender abuse resulted in a carefully drafted provision that is
well balanced and effectively encourages citizen enforcement of environmental regulations. Congress was cognizant of potential problems and, therefore, included three abuse safeguards and provided access to the courts only
in certain situations. The result has been that citizen suit provisions have
been utilized responsibly and without abuse. Those instituting citizen suits
have generally been found to avoid trivial violations and focus on significant
infractions. 8
Citizen activity plays an important role in the enforcement of environmental regulations. Because of Congressional care taken in the creation of the
citizen suit provision, it is not a convenient avenue available to the zealous
environmental group for harassment or intimidation of regulated industry.
requirement serves many valuable services beyond limiting frivolous lawsuits); Richard E.
Schwartz & David P. Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean Air Act,
17 NAT. RESOURCES L. 327, 327-28 (1984) (noting that parties desire to avoid litigation and
generally hold meetings during the sixty day waiting period to discuss possible settlement
options).
83. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1988), states that "no action may be
commenced ... if the administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the standard,
limitation, or order .... "
84. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (preferring a straightforward analysis). The court relied on the wording of the Clean Water Act
which "unambiguously" refers to an "action in a court of the United States, or a state." Id.
The court held that it would be inappropriate to expand this to include administrative enforcement actions. Id. at 62; see also Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1524-25
(9th Cir. 1987) (following the Second Circuit's reasoning in Friends of the Earth analysis).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988).
86. Fotis, supra note 78, at 127 n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36
(1970)) (discussing the appropriate standard as a tool to be utilized to prevent or deter harassing suits); 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (asserting that the whenever appropriate standard should be regarded as an implement to penalize those plaintiffs who
initiate harassing citizen suits); see also supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text (discussing
the congressional fear that allowing citizens to enforce environmental regulations would result
in abuses).
87. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 728-29 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (preventing defendant's recovery of attorney's fees unless the plaintiff's suit is deemed
frivolous or harassing).
88. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES V-8 to V-10 (noting that citizen organi-

zations generally initiate actions only for significant rather than minor violations).
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Considering the recognized importance of private involvement in environmental regulation (and any other public debate), it is critical that necessary
steps are taken to actively foster participation. Potential defendants must be
prevented from abusing the legal process to retaliate against a citizen's legitimate participation in the enforcement process.
11.

INTIMIDATION SUITS AND SLAPPS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE PROBLEM

In the past decade, a trend has developed that is a growing menace to
public interest litigation. Citizens who have committed themselves as advo-

cates of the public interest are being sued by those affected by their activities.
Although these suits rarely succeed, 89 the primary goals of retaliation and
intimidation are generally realized. The effect is the stiffing of the activities
of citizens who are exercising their right to petition the government. Even
though the statutory and common law encourages public interest activism 90
by making it nearly impossible for intimidation plaintiffs to prevail, 9' this
species of litigation is successful in achieving the intended effect of silencing
and punishing the opponent.
This type of suit has been defined as a SLAPP suit, an acronym for "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. ' 92 The most typical SLAPP
suit involves a developer plaintiff suing a group of citizens who oppose the
development. 93 SLAPP plaintiffs use tort law to punish citizens for exer94
cising their constitutional right to speak and petition the government.
SLAPP suits are essentially civil lawsuits "aimed at preventing citizens from
exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so." 9 5
89. Brecher, supra note 5, at 105.
90. See generally supra notes 11-88 and accompanying text (discussing public participation in governmental functioning and its encouragement).
91. See Brecher, supra note 5, at 105.
92. The SLAPP suit was first coined by Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 506. SLAPP's
may also be defined as "public interest intimidation suits."
93. Canan & Pring, supra note 8, at 389; Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp.
523 (N.D. I1. 1990). In Westfield Partners, a real estate developer sued landowners who had
successfully petitioned to defeat construction of a proposed thoroughfare that would have
served as an access point to a new subdivision. The developer sought monetary relief on three
counts; conspiracy, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and slander of
title to property. The developer sought three million in compensatory damages and one million in punitive damages against the homeowners that opposed the thoroughfare. The homeowners only activity was to file a petition to vacate the proposed thoroughfare and attend a
public hearing. The petition was filed pursuant to Illinois state law and proper notice of a
public hearing was provided. Despite the import of the hearing, the plaintiff-developer failed
to appear. The proposed thoroughfare was vacated by the decision of the Wayne Township
Highway Commissioner. Id. at 524.
[D]evelopers who are disappointed with local land use decisions persist in seeking federal avenues to receive favorable decisions. The court perceives this, with
a great deal of alarm, as part of a growing trend of what have come to be known
as 'SLAPP suits'. . . . Examination of the facts and allegations in plaintiff's
complaint compel this court to view the underlying purpose of this suit with
great skepticism.
Id. at 524-25.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 506; see Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F.
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They are typically commenced when "[o]ne party [has] approached some
' 96
government body or office about a matter that affected some other party.
Four major SLAPP characteristics have been identified by researchers and
commentators. 97 First, SLAPP suits are frivolous civil actions that disguise
constitutionally protected political activity as common tort claims. 98 Second, the tort claims most frequently alleged by SLAPP plaintiffs include one
or more of the following: defamation, 99 interference with prospective advan02
10
tage,1 00 interference with contractual relations, ' malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, 10 3 denial of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment property
rights, 1°4 civil conspiracy, 10 5 or nuisance. 10 6 Third, the damages claimed
are enormous relative to the resources of the defendant.' 0 7 Fourth, an indi-

vidual defendant in a SLAPP suit is forced to incur considerable litigation
costs,' 0 8 often resulting in the forced termination of the petitioning activity
1990). The court held that the defendants' petitioning of local govSupp. 523, 525 (N.D. I11.
ernmental officials was absolutely privileged under the first amendment. Id. "Plaintiff's entire complaint against defendants' is based upon nothing more than defendants' exercise of
their right, under the first amendment, to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
Id..
96. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 508 (noting that 71 percent of the SLAPP suits studied are of this type).
97. See Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in the First Amendment Law and in the Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 984
(1992).

98. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511.
99. Id. at 511-12; Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (claiming

defamation in suit by a logging company); see, e.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626
F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (claiming defamation as one of multiple claims).
100. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511-12; Sierra Club, 349 F. Supp. at 935-36; see, e.g.,
Westfield Partners, Inc. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (claiming tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage as one of three typical SLAPP causes of
action).
101. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511-12.
102. See, e.g., David Sive, Countersuits, Delay, Intimidation Caused by Public Interest
Suits, NAT'L L.J., June 19, 1989, at 26 (citing Adams v. Town of Rockland, 989 (Sup. Ct.,
Sullivan Cty., N.Y., filed June 11, 1971) (discussed in Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit
Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications and Proposed
Solutions, 74 MICH.L. REV. 106, 107, 112 (1975)).
103. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1988) (claiming prima facie

tort).
104. See Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Westfield

Partners, Inc. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524 (claiming that city government slandered the
title of the plaintiff's real estate).
105. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511-12; see Westfield Partners, 740 F. Supp. at 524
(alleging defendants conspired with city officials to deprive plaintiff of the right to develop land

without due process of law). "Plaintiff's allegations of 'conspiracy' amount to nothing more
than the wholly lawful exercise, by citizens in a community, of the right to petition their local
government to follow a certain course of action." Id. at 526.
106. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511-12.
107. Id. at 512; see Westfield Partners,740 F. Supp. at 524 (claiming four million dollars in
damages against local homeowners); Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 610 (claiming $1.7 million in

damages against various public officials, landowners, and landowners' attorney for their legitimate effort to rezone land owned by developer).
108. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 512. The researchers found that the average SLAPP

claim for damages was $7.4 million, ranging from $10,000 to $100 million. Attorney's fees are
also debilitating to the average SLAPP defendant. Canan and Pring noted one individual
defendant who was told that her defense would cost $10,000. Id.
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and the correspondent dropping of the suit. 109
Often the intent (and actual effect) of these suits is to chill public participation beyond the activity sought to be repressed.1 10 For example, in 1980 a
citizen group calling itself the West Valley Taxpayers and Environmentalists
Association (a tiny ad hoc group comprised of suburban homeowners initially formed to oppose the construction of a college football stadium in their
neighborhood)"1 I petitioned their local government for a referendum on a
proposed hillside development. 1 2 As a result of this citizen involvement,
the residents of the community passed a one-year moratorium on hillside
development and instituted a controlled growth initiative.
Soon after the moratorium went into effect, Victor Monia, the president of
the Association, was SLAPPed with a $40 million suit filed by the principal
developer, the Parnas Company. Parnas also named two other citizens'
groups and their presidents in their complaint. Parnas claimed damages resulting from a flier distributed prior to the election. The Parnas Corporation
failed to drop Monia or his citizen group even though it later learned that
Monia and his group were not responsible for the publication or distribution
of the flier.' 1 3 "People just melted away," Monia said.
We had a very active organization with 550 homeowners, and we had
won 16 or 18 elections in a row. The year after the suit, we won only
one and lost three or four. Membership in the first year dropped to 100,
and by the second year of the suit, it was really only the board of directors and hard-core folks, about 25 of us, who were left. People wondered about our judgment. Were they going to be dragged in? People
who had been very active just sort of disappeared. They wouldn't even
14
sign a petition.
Two years later, after the corporation had received favorable zoning, the
lawsuit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 1 I
The Supreme Court has long recognized the potential "chilling effect" on
the exercise of First Amendment rights when First Amendment activity is
the essence of a plaintiff's claim. 1 6 The problem, and often the SLAPP
109. See Canan, supra note 3, at 26-32.
110. Some defendants in environmental actions employ countersuits as a mechanism primarily intended to discourage the vigorous pursuit of environmental cases. The huge amount
sought in damages makes the litigation significant to the SLAPP defendant. The SLAPP litigation, at the minimum, redirects the citizen-activists efforts totally towards personal defense
and away from public interest activities. An attorney involved in many toxic tort actions
stated that SLAPP suits "scare the victims who have been exposed to toxic materials to death"
and that his "clients are absolutely freaked out by the cases." Carl Tobias, Environmental
Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 430 (1992) (citing a telephone interview
with an unnamed environmental attorney conducted on Apr. 9, 1991).
111. Canan, supra note 3, at 27.
112. Monia v. Parnas Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1991); Canan, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing the history of the case and the effects on the citizens involved).
113. Canan, supra note 3, at 28.
114. Karl Olsen & Erin Daly, A Slap at SLAPP Suits is a Signature Away: Legislation on
Governor Wilson's Desk Puts a ProceduralHurdle in the Way of Those Who Would Stifle
Speech on Public Business, RECORDER, Oct. 7, 1991, at 6.
115. Canan, supra note 3, at 29.
116. Drombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (noting the potential result of intimidation in the civil rights context). "The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment
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plaintiff's intended result, is the "chilling effect"' 117 on the public's desire to
exercise their First Amendment rights.1 18 A federal district court recently

dismissed an action after the plaintiff's filing of their second amended complaint. This complaint represented the third attempt to attack a citizen's
participation in a public governmental permit proceeding."

9

The court's

opinion expressed indignation over the plaintiff's efforts to continue the meritless litigation. The court noted that, "[t]here is simply nothing remotely
improper about filing environmental or other [permit] objections. Without

something more.., the continued vitality of this lawsuit would unjustifiably
intrude upon defendants' rights to participate in public proceedings." 1 20
The court added that, "[i]rrespective of whether that label [SLAPP] fits, the

Court is mindful that the pendency of this suit, both in litigation costs and
threat of treble damages, could have the effect of chilling the defendants'
rights to public participation."' 2'
The "chilling effect" of such lawsuits may extend well beyond the concern
rights may derive from the fact of prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or
failure." Id. The Supreme Court is very attuned to the sensitivity of the First Amendment
guarantees to the threat of intimidating or harassing litigation. The Court has established
obstacles to litigation in an effort to protect those guarantees. Franchise Realty Interstate
Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); see also 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von
Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's action to prevent the
"chilling effect" resulting from the threat of defamation actions and noting that imposition
of
defamation actions "can deter and silence" people who would otherwise participate in public
debate), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2341 (1993).
117. "A chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by
the first amendment are deterred from doing so ....
Frederick Schauer, Fear,Risk and the
FirstAmendment: Unraveling the "ChillingEffect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978). Citizens
are deterred from first amendment activity through the use of tort law by those affected by
their activism.
118. See Drombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Provision of defenses to potential
defendants is not enough to prevent the chilling effect. Id. at 486 (citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); In re Entertainment Partners Group, Inc., 590 N.Y.S.2d 979, 985
(1992).
[TI]he court observes that plaintiff cast its net deliberately to intimidate selected
community leaders. From the court's observation of the individual defendants,
plaintiff appeared to select those with sufficient stability to have something to
lose in a legal contest. Plaintiff could have made its point as easily with this
relatively unified community group by selecting merely one individual as its target. The purpose of a suit of this type is inescapable.
Id.; see Weiss v. Willow Tree Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court
recognizes the "dangerous 'chilling effect' " on the exercise of First Amendment rights if plaintiffs are allowed to institute suits against individuals who exercise those rights. Id. "To permit maintenance of this type of civil rights lawsuit against a private individual would under the
circumstances and uncontested facts shown in this case, have an unfortunate and unjust chilling effect upon the exercise by members of the public of their First Amendment right to
complain about a public nuisance." Id. (quoting Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F. Supp. 1150, 1153
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976)).
119. Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Northern Cal. and N. Nev. Pipe Trades Council, No. C90-3628 EFL, 1992 WL 131162 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1992).
120. Id. at *11.
121. Id. at * 12. The court dismissed the claim stating" '[I]n view of the burden on defendant's exercise of its First Amendment rights which would be imposed by unnecessarily prolonging this litigation, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.' " Id. (quoting Barger v.
Playboy Enter., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984)).

19931

SLAPP SUITS

immediately at issue. Citizens, who are normally not predisposed to consider the threat of litigation as an inherent cost of participating in government, find themselves less willing to become involved in public debate and
governmental decision making. 122 Citizens, businesses, and governmental
officials should not be forced to make civic decisions influenced by an appre23
hension of costly litigation.
Several factors combine to create the "chilling effect."' 24 First, there is
the reasonable fear that one may be found liable for damages based on the
likelihood of an erroneous judgment. Appeal from an erroneous judgment
does not lend much comfort as it offers extended litigation, a continued
drain on financial resources, and is time consuming. Additionally, there is
no guarantee that an appeal will reverse the initial judgment. Also complicating the scenario is the unfamiliarity with complex tort laws that the lay
citizen must face when considering the legality of his protected First
Amendment activities. 12 5 Finally, even if the citizen was assured of the legality of his or her conduct, the time requirements
and financial costs of
126
defending against a claim are often prohibitive.
Effective solutions to SLAPP litigation will only be devised if it is understood why these suits are effective. First, SLAPP suits immediately place the
citizen-defendant in significant economic peril. Suddenly, instead of fighting
for a particular civic cause, the citizen is fighting for his personal financial
future. As a defendant, the citizen no longer enjoys the benefits accorded to
the public interest litigant (i.e. statutory rules allowing the plaintiff to recover attorney fees and other litigation costs). Not only is the citizen forced
to expend significant amounts of time and effort defending against the frivolous claim, but he also risks becoming personally liable for massive damages.127 Second, a SLAPP suit redirects the citizen's efforts away from
opposing the business interests of the SLAPP plaintiff and towards the legal
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying discussion.
123. In Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 940 (1977), the plaintiff, a franchise of McDonald's restaurant, sued a restaurant, employer and a labor union for
their opposition to the grant of permits by the city board. Plaintiff claimed over $11 million in
damages. Recognizing the potential chilling effect that this type of suit might engender, the
court asked rhetorically,
[W]hat competitor, knowing that its participation in administrative proceedings
might result in expensive and burdensome litigation, which would drag on
through the discovery stage at least, would not thereby feel pressured to forego
presenting its views to the government? . . . [T]he long drawn out process of
discovery can be both harassing and expensive. When this well known fact is
combined with the large damages usually claimed (here at $11,100,000.00) and
sometimes awarded, an action like this one can be, from the very beginning, a
most potent weapon to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Id. at 1082.
124. See id. (discussing the "chilling effect" and providing a thorough free speech analysis).
See generally Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 30.
125. STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 29.13-.131 (1993).
126. Canan, supra note 3, at 26 (finding that the average SLAPP suit required thirty-six
months of litigation and a number of appeals before defendant finally was able to prevail).
127. Personal accountability averages $9,000,000 in the 228 SLAPP suits included in
Canan's research. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 26.
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defense. 128 When claims for damages reach into the tens of millions of dollars and victory is not a certainty, the SLAPP litigation becomes all-consuming. Considering the enormously large claims for damage, the SLAPP suit
immediately becomes the most important issue for the citizen at the expense
by the "chilof the petitioning activity. 129 This intuitive result is evidenced
130
ling effect" that accompanies the filing of a SLAPP Suit.
Third, the SLAPP suit puts citizens on the defensive and places an overwhelming economic burden on their limited personal resources. 131 The inequality of resources becomes the plaintiff's greatest weapon. The SLAPP
plaintiff is willing to expend resources as long as the costs do not exceed the
anticipated benefit-the cessation of the offensive (but constitutionally protected) petitioning activities of the citizen defendant. The defendant is
forced to weigh the benefit of continuing the public interest activities, which
may afford only limited personal reward, against potentially massive personal liability. 132 A risk/utility analysis weighs heavily against continued
civic involvement.
Finally, a SLAPP suit effectively suspends the petitioning activity that the
SLAPP plaintiff wishes to obstruct. 133 Fearful of becoming the targets of a
multimillion dollar lawsuit, the community support for the original petitioning activity crumbles. 134 The fear of retribution squelches the citizens desire
to participate in government. Unfortunately, this intimidation comes at the
expense of protected First Amendment activity and regulations that rely on
public participation as a form of supplemental enforcement. 135 Legislative
128. Brecher, supra note 5, at 118.
129. Consider Victor Monia's account of the ramifications he experienced as a result of the
Parnas Corp. SLAPP suit:
I became so preoccupied by the suit that it changed my whole focus and direction in life.... I got appraisals on my house and thought of moving to Oregon.
I'm like most Americans: My assets are in my home. This case was an overhanging cloud. Even though you may prevail, you'll spend a ton of money fighting it. You can win and still lose. I didn't function well at work because I was
trying to figure out how I was going to protect my family. The president [of the
firm] called me in one day and said my performance wasn't satisfactory and
asked me for my resignation. If I didn't resign, I'd get fired the next day. I
resigned.
Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at
6. For an example of how convoluted SLAPP litigation can become, see Franchise Realty
Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d
1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977) (appeal from a judgment dismissing the
plaintiff's amended complaint without leave to amend and from an order denying a motion
filed after the judgment for leave to amend the first amended complaint).
130. See Eve Pell, Lawsuits That Chill Local Politics, 4 CAL. L., Feb. 1984, at 44. See
generally Canan & Pring, supra note 4; Canan & Pring, supra note 8.
131. See Waldman, supra note 97, at 993-94.
132. See supra note 127.
133. SLAPP defendants generally "prevailed after an average of thirty-six months and the
involvement of a number of court levels." Canan, supra note 3, at 26.
134. Walter Lucas, Using the Courts to Quiet Critics; Activists Get SLAPPed Around in New
Breed of Cases, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1990, at 3.
135. Numerous federal regulatory schemes include provisions that encourage citizen suits
as a means of enforcement. See Clean Air Act, § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 1990); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Comprehensive
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and judicial action will be required to resolve the current threat, actual and

prospective, to the constitutionally protected activities of both parties.
III.

LEGITIMATE AND COMPETING INTERESTS OF BOTH
PARTIES: DESIGNING SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT
ADVERSE PRIVILEGES

A.

THE

SLAPP PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST

The use of lawsuits as an implement of intimidation is not a new concept.
In the 1960s, similar lawsuits were filed against civil rights activists who
boycotted white merchants in an effort to end racial discrimination. 136 Like
those merchants, SLAPP plaintiffs are attempting to protect their interests,
many claiming that litigation of the original suit is considered to be their last
resort. 137 It is for this reason that the New York State Builders Association
opposed the New York anti-SLAPP bill.' 38 The New York State Builders
Association's executive vice president, Robert Weebolt, stated that current
sanctions provide an adequate level of protection. 39 His position is that
"vituperation and calumny" is often directed toward land developers, and
the threat of a lawsuit is necessary "to keep the debate within certain bounds
of civility."1 4 ° Often a lawsuit is the only mechanism available for a developer or regulated industry to obtain redress for monetary injury. Losses that
are caused by meritless, overzealous political opposition and frivolous citizen
4
suits cannot be recovered without the aid of a lawsuit.' '
SLAPP suits are preferred over other judicially established mechanisms to
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), § 310, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (1988); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, § 326, 42
U.S.C. § 11046 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Safe
Drinking Water Act, § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Ocean Dumping Act), § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Noise Control
Act of 1972, § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Endangered Species Act of 1973, § l(g), 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988).
136. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
137. Gary Spencer, Bill Aimed at Curbing Retaliatory Suits, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 1990, at 1.
138. Id. The anti-SLAPP bill was recently passed by the New York legislature and signed
by Governor Mario Cuomo. Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs Bill to Deter SLAPP Lawsuits,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 1. The legislation became effective January 1, 1993. Id.; 1992 N.Y.
Laws 767.
139. Spencer, supra note 137, at 1.
140. Id.
141. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (extending the antitrust Noerr-Pennington immunity to petitioning activity unrelated to antitrust
actions); Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Il. 1990) (citing
California Motor Transport and noting that the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine would not allow the extension of liability to petitioning activity when it is shown that
the petitioning was essentially nothing more than an attempt to harass). But see Weiss v.
Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Weiss court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendants were not afforded First Amendment immunity because their "real
motivation" was to pressure town officials and harass plaintiffs, and not to air public issues
openly. The court held that the First Amendment protection is not dependent on motivation,
but depends instead on the nature of the defendants' conduct. Id. at 816 (citing Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
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control frivolous litigation. Rule 11 sanctions are rarely sought by environmental litigants. 142 An informal investigation of environmental attorneys
found that Rule 11 is rarely utilized. 143 The principal reason underlying the
lack of reliance on Rule 11 by environmental defendants is that the use of a
SLAPP suit exposes citizen activists to "liability which is orders of magnitude larger than Rule 11." 144 The use of a SLAPP suit substantially increases the potential "chilling effect" on the citizens and serves to restrict
federal court access. 145 Professor George Pring noted that SLAPP plaintiffs
choose SLAPP suits over the Rule 11 avenue because SLAPP litigation
46
threatens the target with greater exposure to liability. 1
Any regulation of SLAPP suits to protect the rights of the defendant
14 7
would tax the rights that any deserving plaintiff should be able to enjoy.
If it is true that litigation is a last resort for many SLAPP plaintiffs, then
SLAPP regulation would directly threaten the plaintiff's right to petition for
redress of grievances. 148 SLAPP plaintiffs allege that the transformation of a
political battle into a legal battle is a tool traditionally employed by the reformer, not the developer. 149 Many who do not view SLAPP suits as a problem argue that the judicial process has always been used for purposes of
intimidation. 50 The difference today is that the party using the lawsuit to
intimidate was once the party who was intimidated.
Courts should not be too eager to summarily dismiss the expressed justifications of SLAPP plaintiffs or to even characterize a lawsuit as a SLAPP.
There are instances where an entity is victimized by the corrupt use of environmental litigation.' 3 ' For example, some organized labor groups claim to
142. Tobias, supra note 110, at 434.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 489 (citing a telephone interview with environmental attorney on Apr. 9, 1991
and with Professor George Pring, Denver University College of Law on Mar. 19, 1991). Professor Pring received a National Science Foundation grant to study SLAPP suits with Professor Penelope Canan at Denver University.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 479 n.244.
147. See Curbing SLAPP Suits, NEWSLETTER, BAR Assoc. OF SAN FRANCISCO, Mar. 17,

1992, at 4 (Supplement to the RECORDER) (supporting California anti-SLAPP bill in principle
but expresses concern over the difficulty in distinguishing a SLAPP suit from a legitimate
defamation suit).
148. See Kenneth J. Garcia, Slapp in the Facefor ProtestingHomeowners, L.A. TIMES, July
5, 1990, at Jl (claiming that litigation was plaintiff's last resort).
149. Richard 0. Brooks, Les Mains Sales: The Ethicaland PoliticalImplications ofSLAPP
Suits, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1989) (citing S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS (1974)).
150. Id. at 62-63.
151. See 136 CONG. REC. S 16878 (1990) (statement of Sen. Symms). "As Mr. Schneider
of the Sierra Club said, you have to use your own judgment and how far you want to go with
shading and distorting the truth in order to gin up, and stir up the controversy." Id. Sen.
Symms continued with a quote from Dr. Jo Kwong Echard's book entitled Studies in Organization Trends Protecting the Environment:
Other corporations are well aware of the environmental activists agenda but
have found that settlement seems to be the least harmful and least costly course
to pursue. Under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, as we have seen, environmentalists can negotiate substantial out-ofcourt settlements merely by threatening to sue .... Although it is difficult to

substantiate, it is widely felt that corporations contribute heavily to environmen-
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have found a tool to use against non-union companies. Northern California
construction unions are using "environmental extortion" against non-union
employers. 152 When a non-union employer comes to town, the union raises
environmental concerns as an obstacle and "aggressively" intervenes in the
permitting process.153 The tactic appears to be working as many employers
eventually grant the environmental or labor concessions. 15 4 The employers,
noting that the environmental action is stopped once labor demands are met,
charge the unions with abuse of the permitting and environmental review
processes.1 55 Instead of settling the labor problems at the bargaining table,
the unions will attack environmental problems "full bore, challenging everytreatment, from
thing from air pollution assessments to plans for sewage
56
water supply and soil contamination to traffic impact."'
A federal district court recently faced such a dispute in Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Northern Californiaand Northern Nevada Pipe Trades Council.1 57 Petrochem Insulation contended that the Pipe Trades Council was

abusing the permitting process by making "baseless environmental objections"'158 in an effort to delay Petrochem's permitting until they agreed to
hire union-only contractors. 5 9 The court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, weighing its decision heavily in favor of the Trade Council's right to
participate in public proceedings. 6° These types of disputes illustrate the
importance of developing a reliable method of distinguishing the legitimate
use of the legal process (compensation of real injury) from SLAPP litigation
designed to silence civic expression.
1. Economic Injury and ReputationalHarm
a. Tortious Interference
A citizen who protests a development is undeniably interfering with the
developer's economic advantage. Statements made by citizens at public
hearings are rarely designed to praise the opposed developer. Considering
tal activist organizations hoping to buy protection from the overzealous uses of
these laws. Contributors to the National Wildlife Federation, for example, include Amoco Foundation, Mobil Oil Foundation, ARCO Foundation, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Dow Chemical, Du Pont, Exxon, General
Motors, Monsanto, Pennzoil, and Weyerhaeuser.
Id. at S16890.
152. Stephen G. Hirsh, Green With Enmity: Organized Labors Use of Environmentalism as
Leverage Has ContractorsCrying Foul, But So Far Courts Have Sided with the Unions, RECORDER, Aug. 6, 1992, at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. A management lawyer says that the threat of environmental action is raised during contract negotiations even before the environmental permits are up for review. "I have a
case where, I can't say what the exact words were, but the message was very clearly conveyed
that if they did not sign an agreement up front that they would have serious problems in the
permitting process." Id.
157. No. C-90-3628 EFL, 1992 WL 131162 (Mar. 19, 1992).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *11.
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the nature of the political activities, it is not surprising that the two most
common grounds for a SLAPP suit are intentional interference with economic advantage (compensation for economic loss) 16 1 and defamation (com62
pensation for reputational harm).1
The tort of interference is important to the business plaintiff because it
protects against third parties who intentionally and adversely attempt to influence business relations. A claim of interference traditionally requires a
showing of the defendant's intent to disrupt a potential economic advantage. 163 Citizen efforts to force reconsideration of a governmental action
that results in injury to a business plaintiff (i.e. zoning or permitting) may
create a prima facie case for interference."6 The relative ease of pleading
requirements and the nature of the citizen-government-business relationship
render interference a popular SLAPP claim. Generally the interference
must be intentional. Some courts, however, have relaxed the intent require165
ment to one of negligent interference.
Some commentators object to the idea that civic activism can constitute a
tortious act: "[O]ne who accepts free speech as a fundamental part of our
way of life must have at least some doubts about the liability for persuading
another person to terminate a contract."' 166 The effort to allow all parties to
petition for redress of grievances has enabled some plaintiffs to encroach
upon the privilege of those exercising the same constitutional right.167 The
tort of interference makes the battle of interests very clear. Continued recognition of the tort of interference without some First Amendment consideration will continue to provide a relatively simple means for SLAPP plaintiffs
to punish their opponent's political participation. The status quo will continue to invite harassing and vexatious litigation as it provides the means to
the end. However, if tort liability is scaled back in this area, it will result in
fewer available opportunities for recovery to the legitimately injured plaintiff. Interference is not a claim that inherently implicates First Amendment
rights of the defendant. The best solution may include provision of defenses
to the defendant against malicious use of this claim instead of restricting its
availability to those whose legitimate interests have been tortiously afflicted.
Availability of defenses should be predicated on either the nature of the ac161. See generally SPEISER, supra note 125, §§ 31.74-.145 (discussing the laws on interference with contractual relations and prospective advantage).
162. Canan & Pring, supra note 4, at 511-12.
163. Waldman, supra note 97, at 987; see Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097,

1126 (1993).
164. Waldman, supra note 97, at 987.
165. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65-66 (Cal. 1979); Consolidated Aluminum
Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 772 F.2d 1217, 1218 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing the district court
grant of summary judgment on basis that negligent interference may constitute a legitimate
cause of action). But see Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. Stein, 651 P.2d 637, 638
(Nev. 1982); Getty Ref. & Mkts. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting
that all courts today, with isolated exceptions, adopt a "bright line rule" that precludes recovery based on negligent interference).
166. Waldman, supra note 97, at 987 (citing Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual
Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REv. 335, 363 (1980).
167. Dobbs, supra note 166, at 376.
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tion being commenced (i.e. application of a SLAPP definition) or on the
nature of the activity resulting in the alleged interference (i.e. exercise of
First Amendment rights).
b.

Defamation

The development of defamation law has enabled a lawsuit to be filed
against a private figure without at first appearing to be frivolous. The charade is effective initially because a private figure is only required to show that
the defendant made a negligent misstatement of fact to successfully state a
claim. Contrast the requirement for public figures who must prove actual
malice by the defendant. Actual malice is demonstrated by proof of the defendant's reckless disregard for the truth or knowledge of the falsity of the
remark. 168 The tort of defamation, as in interference, allows SLAPP plaintiffs to easily clear the pleading hurdle when the defendant makes an adverse
169
public statement.
Regulation of SLAPP suits by adjusting traditional defamation law would
require the creation of a different plaintiff classification scheme. A change
would dictate that plaintiff satisfy significantly more rigorous pleading requirements before recovery would be available for reputational injury. However, drastic changes in defamation law may be avoided simply by including
a threshold pleading barrier to prevent characteristic SLAPP litigation.
One way to effectuate such a pleading barrier would be to apply a SLAPP
definition (to be used as a definitional filter). The court would rely on the
"public figure" standard if the definition was applicable to the lawsuit. This
would obviate abuse of liberal defamation pleading requirements to chill
public debate. The key is to eliminate, at the outset, a small subclass of
claims that assail constitutionally protected activities.
B.

INTERESTS OF THE DEFENDANT, NON-PARTIES AND THE COURT

An interest that is often overlooked is that of the judicial system itself.
SLAPP suits further overburden the courts. 170 SLAPP researchers, profes168. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991); Harte-Hanks Comm. Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658

(1989).
169. An individual who is active in the community and participates politically, perhaps by
petitioning or speaking at a public hearing against a proposed development, and causes some
degree of reputational harm to the private defendant may be held liable for the resultant damages. If the object of the comments is a public figure, however, they will be unable to sue
although the activity of the activist was exactly the same in both instances; the Petition Clause
does not afford absolute immunity to those seeking redress. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,
482 (1985). "Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libel." Id. at
483. A defendant's petitioning is actionable if it was prompted by "express malice" defined as
"falsehood and the absence of probable cause." Id. at 483 (citing White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S.
266 (1845)).
170. See Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979, 985-87 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992) (noting that the courts are increasingly asked to enforce sanctions because
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sors Pring and Canan, estimate that hundreds of these suits are filed every
year. 17 1 SLAPP suits appear to represent a relatively new pressure on court
dockets since all the SLAPP cases identified had been filed since 1970. 172
The burden on the courts is accentuated by the SLAPP plaintiff's effort to
embroil the defendant in expensive, extended legal battles. Professor Canan
reports that the typical SLAPP suit continues for an average of thirty-six
173
months and travels through several court levels.
As previously discussed, the effect that SLAPP suits may be having on
citizens who plan to participate in their local government does much to discredit the notions of equality, fairness, and justice that citizens expect the
justice system to deliver. The SLAPP problem also raises serious questions
regarding the real import of First Amendment rights to those sworn to uphold the Constitution.
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, it is the "chilling effect" that is
most pervasive and troublesome. 174 As reports of multi-million dollar lawsuits against individual citizens for seemingly harmless and normal activity
continue to increase, those involved in their communities will become increasingly cognizant of the threat, real or imagined, that they may be subjected to a similar retaliatory suit. 17 5 Letters to the editors describing
personal experiences as SLAPP targets are certain to make the reader think
about the potential costs of becoming active in the community. Elizabeth
Leeds, a California resident who opposed local road construction, wrote a
letter that appeared in the Los Angeles Times, and commented as follows:
I am being sued in federal court with a SLAPP suit by developers and
the quasi-governmental agency (the Transportation Corridor Agency).
Being a concerned citizen and affected by the TCA's proposed construction... I acted to save this beautiful area of natural wilderness following our environmental protection laws and now the TCA has SLAPPed
me in retaliation .... The TCA is endeavoring to keep me from challenging the federal environmental impact statement (EIS) for the
76
corridor. 1
Although no empirical studies have been completed on the subject,' 77 uncertainty regarding liability, the high costs of litigation and the threat of errone"courts are needlessly flooded and clogged with claims that advance no legitimate purpose");
Rittenhause v. St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 579 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(declaring it "appropriate at this time to indicate to the bar that frivolous and baseless actions
will not be tolerated ... ").
171. Pring, supra note 3, at 5.
172. Id.
173. Canan, supra note 3, at 26.
174. See supra notes 89-135 and accompanying text.
175. See Waldman, supra note 97, at 991-97.
176. Elizabeth Leeds, Letter to the Editor, Litigation Targets Slap Back at SLAPP Suits,

L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1992, at B7 (calling for public outcry and support to help stop the
intimidation by the TCA).

177. Canan and Pring are currently involved in this type of research but have yet to release
their results. Pring, supra note 3, at 8 n.9. Canan and Pring are extending their research of
SLAPP suits to the 'ripples' -

those involved in the petitioning activity which provoked the

SLAPP, but not named as parties to the suit; and 'untouchables' - those who are politically
active, but have never been sued in and have no knowledge of SLAPPs. Id.
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ous judgments all play a role in the "chilling effect."' ' 7 8
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO
INHIBIT THE ABUSE OF LITIGATION FOR
INTIMIDATION AND RETRIBUTION

Most SLAPP defendants prevail. They have effective defenses at their dis-

posal that eventually protect against civil liability. 179 These defenses, unfortunately, become available relatively late in the litigation.
One form of defense is a claim of immunity. The United States Supreme
Court has provided a qualified immunity in libel actions for citizens who
petition the government.180 The SLAPP defendant's immunity in a libel action is lost if the plaintiff demonstrates that the petitioning activity was exercised with actual malice.' 8 1 The Supreme Court of West Virginia disputed
the plaintiff's ability to defeat such an immunity, noting that a number of
earlier federal cases hold that even proof of malice or intent would not defeat
the defendant's First Amendment right to petition. 18 2 The basis of those
decisions rested on the fear that permitting the introduction of such proof to
overcome the Constitutional right to petition would so discourage its exercise as to constitute an impermissible burden on8 3the defendant. The court
quoted Judge Zirpoli from Sierra Club v. Butz,1
[T]he malice standard invites intimidation of all who seek redress from
the government; malice is easy to allege under modern pleading rules
... and therefore in most cases even those who acted without malice
would be put to the burden and expense of defending a lawsuit. Thus,

"breathing space" that First
the malice standard does not supply the
84
Amendment freedoms need to survive.'
An extension of immunity available to defendants in antitrust actions has
afforded a defense to SLAPP defendants. 1 85 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine
178. See text accompanying notes 110-26 for discussion of the "chilling effect"; Schauer,
supra note 117, at 693.
179. Many have already been discussed in this article. They include the constitutional
right to petition and the constitutional right to free speech. First Amendment protection was
examined in Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The Sierra Club brought
an injunction action against a logging company to prevent logging activities. The logging company filed a countersuit claiming interference with a contractual right. The claim was eventually dismissed based on the protection provided by the first amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. Id. at 935.
180. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985).
181. The Court defines "actual malice" as "knowledge at the time that the words are false,
or... without probable cause or without checking for truth by the means at hand." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. at 485 (quoting Dellinger v. Belk, 238 S.E.2d 788, 789 (N.C. 1977)).
This holding forces a ruling on the actual malice claim and extinguishes the prospect of early
dismissal. Summary judgment is not an available mechanism to SLAPP defendants since notice pleading renders the establishment of a factual controversy a relatively simple task for the
SLAPP plaintiff. The SLAPP defendant thus has a difficult time establishing the malicious
motivation of the plaintiff. Brecher, supra note 5, at 112.
182. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 40 (W. Va. 1981).
183. NLRB v. Handy Hardware, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
184. Id. at 938.
185. See generally Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (dismissing claims based on immunity under extension of Noerr-Pennington).
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creates an immunity for citizens and companies that are politically involved.
"Noerr-Pennington is rooted on the First Amendment right to petition the
government, and 'genuine efforts to induce government to take such lawful
action are beyond the Sherman act.' 186 Courts have used Noerr-Pennington as a method to provide immunity to the SLAPP defendant. 8 7 The
doctrine has been applied so as to provide an absolute immunity to citizens
who petition the government based on the First Amendment." 8
One of the few circumstances where liability would attach to a petitioning
activity is if the activity is found to be a "sham" under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.' 8 9 The Noerr-Pennington "sham exception" is available
as a mechanism for the SLAPP plaintiff to defeat the defendant's "absolute"
privilege.' 90 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine itself provides little protection
to most SLAPP defendants as it is invoked late in the litigation after the
objectives of the SLAPP plaintiff have been fulfilled. 19 The SLAPP plaintiff
has already succeeded in intimidating the citizen-activist with the threat of
liability and has forced the consumption of plaintiff's limited resources in
192
preparing a defense.
Malicious prosection and abuse of process countersuits are sometimes
used by SLAPP defendants as a method to recoup the damage inflicted by
frivolous SLAPP litigation. 93 These countersuits have been coined
"SLAPP-backs." Some SLAPP defendants have found the countersuit to be
very effective. Significant damage awards for claims of malicious prosecution are not uncommon in the SLAPP context.
In 1982, three farmers from Kern County, California placed an ad in a
local newspaper that expressed their support for the proposed Peripheral
Canal, a controversial local water project. J.B. Boswell Co., a powerful
186. Id. (citing Metro Cable v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 224 (7th Cir.
1975).
187. See id. (citing Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir.
1980).

188. Id.
189. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The problem with the
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is that the SLAPP plaintiff still achieves the
SLAPP objective. The suit is filed and must still progress to the point where Noerr-Pennington
can be invoked. Once the court recognizes that, as a matter of law, the defendant has participated in a constitutionally protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the
illegality or tortious nature of the defendant's actions. The objective of the plaintiff has already
been fulfilled as the case must navigate packed court dockets and significant delays.
190. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1920, 1929-30 (1993).
191. See Stein, supra note 7, at 54-55 (discussing Noerr-Penningtonand its inability to address the chilling effect of SLAPP litigation).
192. Id. (stating that "virtually always, the SLAPP plaintiff has no desire to allow the
litigation to proceed to the point where Noerr-Pennington, or any other speech and petitionprotectionist doctrine can be applied").
193. See Monia v. Parnas Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1349 (1991) (awarding SLAPP defendant $260,000 in compensatory and punitive damages for malicious prosecution against a developer); Philip Hager, Tide Turnsfor Targets of SLAPP Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at
A3 (noting that three farmers sued for supporting a controversial water project SLAPPed-back
and were awarded a $13.5 million jury verdict for malicious prosecution).
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"agribusiness giant" opposed to the water project, unsuccessfully sued the
farmers for libel. The defendant farmers decided to take the offensive and
SLAPPed-back with a lawsuit based on malicious prosecution. Nearly ten
years after the initial suit was filed against them, the farmers received a jury
verdict for $13.5 million. 194 Punitive damages comprised $10.5 million of
the total award. 195
The SLAPP-back may provide some relief to the successful countersuit
plaintiff and may make the decision to file a SLAPP suit somewhat more
difficult. In many jurisdictions, however, SLAPP-backs may not be filed until the original SLAPP litigation has been decided on its merits. 196 Since it is
only available after the original action has concluded, the countersuit fails to
prevent the primary evil of SLAPP litigation: intimidation of political participants and the consequential "chilling effect" on petitioning activity.
A.

JUDICIAL REFORMS

In addition to the SLAPP-back suit, other remedies are available to the
courts to contain the harm induced by SLAPP litigation. One significant
tool was created by the Colorado Supreme Court in Protect Our Mountain
Environment Inc. (POME) v. District Court.197 The decision provides judges
with the power to dismiss the claim, under certain circumstances, if the
plaintiff is unable to meet a higher pleading standard. A three-part test was
created for use in actions that are based on a citizen's petitioning activities.
The court adopted a heightened standard for the plaintiff when the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on First Amendment petitioning activ8 Since dismissal
ity. 19
is predicated on the constitutionality of the plaintiff's
claims, the motion to dismiss is treated as one for summary judgment and
the burden shifts to the plaintiff. 199 For a court to conclude that the defendant's activities were not immune from liability, the plaintiff must show:
(1) the defendant's administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support, or, if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion; and (2) the primary purpose of the
defendant's petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; and (3) the defendant's petitioning
activity 2°
had
the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the
°
plaintiff.

If the plaintiff fails to meet the POME criteria, the claim is dismissed.
The POME court noted that "this standard will safeguard the constitutional right of citizens to utilize the administrative and judicial processes for
redress of legal grievances without fear of retaliatory litigation and, at the
194. Hager, supra note 193, at A3.
195. J.S. Boswell Co. v. Family Farmers, No. 179027 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 8, 1988).
196. Paint Products Co. v. Minwax Co., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D. Conn. 1978) (refusing to allow a party to countersue based on a claim of vexatious litigation until the precipitating suit had been decided in favor of the defendant).
197. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
198. Id. at 1368.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1369.
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same time, will permit those truly aggrieved by abuse of these processes to
vindicate their own legal rights."'20 ' Although the POME solution is a
promising response, it may not be enough to prevent the SLAPP suit from
being used as a tool to silence opponents. Other judicial tools must be used
in conjunction with the POME standard to stem the tide of SLAPP
litigation.
Early dismissal is critical to the battle against SLAPP suits. Dismissal
should be granted with prejudice, especially when the plaintiff has used discovery or liberal pleading requirements to delay or harass a defendant and if
the litigation is likely to have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First
Amendment rights. 20 2 Since the mere pendency of a suit seeking relief based
on a defendant's protected petitioning activity chills the exercise of First
Amendment rights, courts should demand that specific allegations be pled
once the First Amendment is invoked in order to dispose of frivolous suits as
20 3
quickly as possible.
Liberal discovery rules provide ripe opportunities for harassment, abuse,
intimidation, and the "vexatious" imposition of expense. 2°4 Although the
rules work to produce relevant evidence, they also allow a plaintiff with a
frivolous claim to delay the conclusion of the action and increase the costs
associated with defense. The liberal interpretation of discovery rules, when
utilized to terrorize the defendant, "is a social cost rather than a benefit."' 20 5
In addition to methods of early dismissal, courts may help battle frivolous
litigation by awarding attorney's fees to the successful SLAPP defendant.
The American Rule prevents the court from awarding attorney's fees unless
one party has acted in bad faith or a statute provides otherwise. 20 6 Other
instances where a court can award attorney's fees include willful failure to
obey a court order or when a party has acted "vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons." ' 20 7 One method of easing the judicial imposition of attorney's fees would be to apply a SLAPP definition. If the suit is determined
to be a SLAPP under the definition, then the plaintiff's conduct would be
201. Id.
202. See Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Northern Cal. and N. Nev. Pipe Trades Council,
No. C-90-3628 FEL, 1992 WL 131162 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (dismissing plaintiff's claims with
prejudice, citing multiple amendments to the complaint and the potential chilling effect).
203. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976) (requiring more specific allegations than
normally required when protected petitioning activity is basis of the claim), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 940 (1977).
204. See id. at 1083.
205. Id. at 1084.
[T]he present suit for $11,000,000 has an inherent chill factor with respect to
defendants' freedom to oppose future permits. In any event, the case illustrates,
in my view, an effect of the unhappy marriage of 'notice' pleading and virtually
unlimited discovery. The 'might makes right' potential in that combination is,
of course, completely contrary to the intent behind the effort to free the pre-trial
phase from formalism and surprise.
Id. at 1086 (Markey, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
206. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
207. Id. at 258-59.
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considered presumptively vexatious, wanton, and oppressive; thus ensuring,
at a minimum, the defendant's recovery of attorney's fees.
Institution of SLAPP suits are often defensive measures to protect multimillion dollar investments. The costs associated with a developer's defense
of a project are certainly an acceptable cost, if not an expected expense of the
development itself. Even though SLAPP defendants may be reasonably certain that attorney's fees will be reimbursed under this scheme, there remains
a high level of uncertainty and personal risk. They are still forced to pay the
costs of their defense up front and continue to fear the threat of a possible
adverse judgment in the millions of dollars. The defendant has an enormous
personal stake in the litigation. The plaintiff, on the other hand, is making
reasonably prudent business decisions as litigation is considered a cost of
doing business and effectively silences critics. Therefore, the threat of the
assessment of attorney's fees in isolation will not act as a deterrent to the
SLAPP filer.
As previously discussed, Rule 11 is rarely used by developers in environmental litigation brought by public interest groups. 20 8 Rule 11 prohibits
pleadings that are filed with an improper purpose such as harassment or
intentionally causing unnecessary delays. 20 9 . The Rule 11 standard is one of
"objective reasonableness. '210 The POME approach 211 may be a better tool
and avoid Rule I l's disadvantages, such as limiting federal court access,
chilling legitimate lawsuits, spawning satellite litigation, and erosion of civility among judges, attorneys, and litigants. 21 2 Rule Il's judicially recognized
purposes of deterrence rather than compensation make it unsuited for re21 3
couping SLAPP litigation expenses and discouraging SLAPP suits.
Instead of immediately running to the courts, defamed parties should attempt to remedy the injury before filing a lawsuit. Courts should recognize
that self-help must be the first remedy sought by those defamed. Self-help is
especially appropriate in cases where the alleged defamatory remarks were
made in a public place. The Supreme Court has recognized that, "[t]he first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help - using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby minimize its adverse impact on reputation. ' 21 4 Courts should, therefore, be reluctant to
208. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text; FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . . and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary

delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Id.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cir. 1989).
The POME approach is discussed supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
Tobias, supra note 110, at 431; see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,

392-93 (1990) (discussing the disadvantages of Rule 11).

213. Tobias, supra note I10, at 431.
214. 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 934 (N.Y. 1992) (citing
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 410 U.S. 323, 344 (1973)), cert. denied, 113 S.'Ct. 2341 (1993).
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allow claims of defamation that arise from public hearings. The public hearing, instead of the courtroom, is the preferred arena in which to remedy the
harm. The defamed party has an immediate opportunity to defend itself by
discrediting the defamatory statements in front of the same audience. 2 15 The
fundamental purpose of the public hearing is to enable parties to have such
exchanges. The notion of self-help supports the rationality of heightened
pleading requirements when the plaintiff claims damages resulting from expression during a public hearing. One minimal pleading requirement might
include holding prospective plaintiffs responsible for showing that efforts
were made to remedy the damage through self-help.
Finally, when a plaintiff's attorney is faced with a client's desire to file a
SLAPP suit, the attorney should consider the ethical implications of filing
such a suit. 216 Disciplinary rules should be stringently enforced to prohibit
harassing or malicious litigation. 217 The ABA Model Rules for Professional
Conduct prohibit an attorney from bringing a suit "unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous .... , 2 18 The comments following Model Rule
3.1 define an action as "frivolous" if the client files the lawsuit "primarily for
the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person ....
,,219 The
Model Rules also temper the attorney's duty to use legal procedure for the
benefit of the client with an additional duty not to "abuse legal procedure."'220 The attorney that accepts employment involving SLAPP litigation
should expect some sort of disciplinary action. Placing the initial burden on
the attorney that files the action is the most efficient and most effective solution as the attorney is in the best position to identify litigation that is intended to harass or maliciously injure. The vigorous application of rules of
professional conduct to an attorney's involvement will go far in the deterrence of SLAPP litigation.
B.

LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES

In addition to the judicial responses to SLAPP litigation, state legislatures
have taken steps to curb the expansion of the SLAPP suit. Most recent legislation has attempted to specifically identify SLAPP suits and address them
in a remedial and preventive manner. 221 The approach is to identify
SLAPPs early in the litigation, and then dismiss them as quickly as possible.
215. Id. "Courts should be reluctant to employ their powers to correct uttered in the giveand-take of live public debate when there is reason to believe that the give-and-take itself can
adequately, and more appropriately remedy the harm." Id. "The First Amendment 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authorative selection.'" Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand) (citation
omitted).
216. Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979, 989 (N.Y. 1992).
217. Id. The court cites New York Disciplinary Rule 7-102 which prohibits a lawyer from
initiating litigation "merely to harass or maliciously injure another." New York Disciplinary
Rule 2-109(A)(l) requires a lawyer to decline such employment. Id.
218. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
219. Id. cmt.
220. Id.
221. See Laura J. Ericson-Siegel, Silencing Slapps: An Examination of ProposedLegislative
Remedies and a "Solution"for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 502 (1992) (defining
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New York recently passed legislation attempting to address SLAPP litigaThe new statute is triggered when a public applicant or permittee
files an action for damages relating to the efforts of the defendant to "report
on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission."'223 SLAPP plaintiffs who claim defamation as a cause of action will be
recognized as public figures requiring a showing of actual malice to afford
recovery. 224 The legislation places an extra burden on the plaintiff requiring
the claim to have a "substantial basis in fact and law."' 225 If the SLAPP
plaintiff fails to meet this burden, defendants will be awarded attorney's fees
and costs. 226 Most significantly, the court is granted the power to award
compensatory damages to the defendant if the lawsuit was filed "for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing" or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech. 227 Punitive damages are available to the
SLAPP defendant if the litigation was initiated for the sole purpose of
228
harassment.
In addition to the deterrence goal, the New York legislation also attempts
to address the SLAPP problem through fast, efficient disposal of frivolous
suits against political participants. Courts are required to grant preference
for motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss. 229 To survive
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the lawsuit has a substantial basis in law or is "supported by a good
230
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
The findings and purpose stated by the New York legislature may be an
indication of future legislative responses to SLAPP litigation:
The legislature hereby declares it to be the policy of the state that the
rights of citizens to participate freely in the public process must be safeguarded with great diligence. The laws of the state must provide the
utmost protection for the free exercise of speech, petition and association rights, particularly where such rights are exercised in a public forum with respect to issues of public concern. The legislature further
finds that the threat of personal damages and litigation costs can be and
has been used as a means of harassing, intimidating or punishing indition.222

SLAPPs using those characteristics identified in the Canan and Pring SLAPP studies conducted at Denver University College of Law).
222. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 1993) (the legislation applies to actions
commenced after January 1, 1993).
223. See Ericson-Siegel, supra note 221, at 512 n.147; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 1993); Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs Bill to Deter SLAPP Lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6,
1992, at 1.
224. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a.
225. Id.
226. Id. Courts and legislatures have recognized that the "remedy of an assessment of
attorney's fees and disbursements has become the single most important device suggested to
deter [frivolous litigation]." Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979,
982 (N.Y. 1992) (citing In re A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y.
1986) and N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 8303-a (McKinney 1992)).
227. EntertainmentPartnersGroup, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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viduals, unincorporated associations, not-for-profit corporations
and
231
others who have involved themselves in public affairs.
Governor Cuomo's signature on this legislation may represent the beginning
of widespread legislative reaction to the abuse of litigation to silence public
opposition.
In California, the state legislature has passed a bill that identifies suits
arising from the exercise of a First Amendment right and subjects such suits
to motions to strike unless the plaintiff is able to show a "substantial
probability of success" on the merits. 232 California's "anti-SLAPP" law offers the defendant a significant tool to stop SLAPP plaintiffs in their
tracks. 233 The law allows SLAPP defendants to file a motion to strike, and if
they succeed they have shown that the lawsuit is focused on the exercise of
his right to free speech. 234 Once the defendant demonstrates this intention,
the burden shifts to the SLAPP plaintiff to prove that the litigation has a
"probability" of success. 235 Additionally, to encourage volunteerism and
political participation, the legislation provides limited immunity for directors of non-profit organizations and absolute immunity to directors of orga236
nizations that carry liability policies.
Other states are poised to react to SLAPP litigation. Rhode Island, Minnesota and Massachusetts are considering legislation aimed at curbing the
effect of SLAPP suits. 237 A bill introduced in Massachusetts will allow defendants to file a special motion to dismiss forcing the suspension of discovery while the court considers the motion.2 38 The bill also threatens
to allow
239
the court to award attorney's fees and damages upon dismissal.
Texas may soon be considering its own anti-SLAPP legislation. 240 Texas
House Bill 149, submitted in 1990, allowed the burden to be shifted to the
SLAPP plaintiff for summary judgment motions. In order to obtain this
advantage, the SLAPP defendant would be required to demonstrate that the
claim is based on the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights at a
governmental proceeding. 24 1 The proposed legislation defined governmental
proceeding as including judicial, administrative, and legislative proceed231. Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 1993)).
232. Tom Dresslar, SLAPP Suit Limits Vetoed by Governor, Los ANGELES J., Oct. 16,
1991, at 4.
233. California Governor Pete Wilson signed Senate Bill 1264 in mid-September. It became to be known as the Lockyer Bill after Senator Bill Lockyer's three year battle to effectuate a SLAPP defense. See Bill Ainsworth, Wilson Signs Bill Curbing SLAPP Suits,
RECORDER, Sept. 18, 1992, at 4.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Dianne Dumanoski, BillAims to Thwart Bullying Lawsuits, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23,
1993, at 20.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Ericson-Siegel, supra note 221, at 514 (citing Tex. H.B. 58, 72d Leg., S.S. (1991)).
This bill was identical to House Bill 149 filed a year earlier. Tex. H.B. 149, 71st Leg., S.S.
(1990).
241. Tex. H.B. 58 at 1-2.
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Summary judgment would be granted if the court could reasonably
conclude that the primary purpose of the suit was to harass or to wrongfully
injure the defendant. 243 The legislation also contemplated the award of
damages to the successful defendant in addition to the grant of summary
judgment. 244 Although this legislation was not considered by the Texas legislature, it marks the growing awareness of the SLAPP problem and the
increasing use of SLAPP-style intimidation outside of the recognized
SLAPP hot beds of California, New York, and Florida.
C.

THE FIFTH ESSENCE: GUIDANCE

Any solution to the problems posed by SLAPP suits and intimidation
suits must address four principal problems. First, the SLAPP defendant
must be protected economically. Unfortunately for the defendant, SLAPP
suits are rarely dismissed prior to discovery. Liberal discovery rules offer an
enormous opportunity for the SLAPP plaintiff to harass, to abuse, and to
impose significant costs on the defendant. "[I]t can make the mere pendency
of a complex lawsuit so burdensome to defendants as to force them to buy
their peace regardless of the merits of the case."' 24 5 Without some sort of
economic protection, the cost of defending one's protected First Amendment
activities may force defendants to settle early in the litigation unless they
enjoy some level of immunity.
Second, the chilling effect of SLAPPs must be contained. Possible remedies include increasing the specificity of the pleading requirements. Uncertainty would be reduced by shifting a heavier burden to the plaintiff when
the defendant is engaged in First Amendment activities. The award of attorney's fees, related litigation costs, and compensatory and punitive awards
would help ease the burden on real and potential SLAPP defendants. Some
action is necessary to limit the negative side effects of legitimate petitioning
activities. Additionally, members and directors of public organizations
should be provided with an adequate level of immunity from litigation and
financial liability. Immunity will serve as an effective offensive tool to battle
the pernicious chilling effect that SLAPP litigation engenders.
Third, SLAPP suits should be resolved quickly. This remedy would entail
defining SLAPP suits for early identification and early disposition. This
would benefit the defendant as well as the burdened court dockets. Since
one of the major goals of a SLAPP suit is to distract the defendant from his
or her petitioning activity, expeditious resolution would help to eliminate
this incentive to initiate litigation.
Fourth, the economic incentive to file a SLAPP suit must be eliminated.
The plaintiff files the suit because the costs of litigation are far less than the
242. Id. at 1.
243. Id. at 2.

244. Id.
245. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
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expected benefit the plaintiff will derive from stopping the petitioning activity. The idea would be to create such enormous costs on the plaintiff who
brings a frivolous suit for the purpose of squelching political participation
that it would no longer be economically justified. One way in which to
achieve this goal is to fashion penalties that are commensurate with the economic advantage the plaintiff had envisioned when filing the claim.
Judicial and legislative efforts designed to control SLAPP litigation to recognize constitutionally protected activities must concentrate on the following criteria: provision of economic protection for the SLAPP defendant
(immunity); speedy identification and disposal of SLAPP suits (certainty);
acknowledgement of the chilling effect on political participation; prevention
of economic benefit for the SLAPP plaintiff (award attorney's fees, costs,
compensatory and punitive damages); and, symmetric recognition of typical
SLAPP plaintiffs and the potential negative effect on legitimate claims. All
the above objectives must be achieved to fairly address the effects of SLAPP
litigation.

